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Mimesis	and	Clinical	Pictures:	Thinking	with	Plato	and	
Broekman	through	the	Production	and	Meaning	of	Images	
of	Disease		
Introduction	We	live	in	a	world	inundated	with	images	and	pictures.1	Images	shape	our	formative	experience,	as	we	learn	and	become	who	we	are	through	physically	mirroring	others’	words,	movements,	and	actions;	moreover,	conceptual	and	artistic	forms	of	representation	shape	our	cognitive,	affective,	aesthetic,	social,	and	political	world.	Aristotle	keenly	notes	the	natural	impetus	behind	such	mimetic	behavior,	as	he	states	in	his	Poetics:	“to	imitate	is	natural	for	human	beings	from	childhood”	(Poetics	4,	1448a8).	Furthermore,	Aristotle	powerfully	points	out	the	pleasant	character	of	mimesis,	arguing	that	those	things	that	we	find	“in	reality”	horrific	(corpses,	insects,	etc.)	can	be	thoroughly	enjoyable	as	we	render	events	and	things	in	words	and	images	and	contemplate	them.2	In	this	regard,	Aristotle,	foreshadowing	Hegel,	finds																																																									1	This	article	is	inspired	by	Jan	Broekman’s	use	of	the	Dutch	term	‘beeld’	in	his	book	
Ziektebeelden	(1993),	which	would	translate	in	English	as	“Clinical	Pictures.”	The	term	‘beeld’	has	a	remarkable	flexibility	and	versatility.	It	entails	the	meaning	of	image,	picture,	statue,	portrait,	representation,	icon,	metaphor,	diagram	and	simulacrum,	among	other	things.	Accordingly,	in	this	paper,	I	seek	to	use	the	terms	‘picture,’	‘image’,	and	‘representation’	interchangeably,	in	conformity	with	the	Dutch	usage	of	the	term	‘beeld.’	This	flexibility	also	implies	that	if	I	use	terms	such	as	‘picture’	or	‘image,’	I	do	not	merely	mean	those	terms	in	a	literal	way,	but	mostly	as	a	way	to	signal	any	(symbolic,	artistic,	social,	etc.)	representation	or	theoretical	abstraction	of	reality.	This	is	in	line	with	Broekman’s	position,	and	with	one	of	the	key	definitions	of	mimesis	as	we	find	it	in	the	comprehensive	work	on	mimesis	by	Gebauer	and	Wulf.	In	their	view,	“Mimesis	is	a	conditio	humana	at	the	same	that	it	is	responsible	for	variations	among	individual	human	beings.	A	spectrum	of	meanings	of	mimesis	has	unfolded	over	the	course	of	its	historical	development,	including	the	act	of	resembling,	of	presenting	the	self	and	expression	as	well	as	mimicry,	imitatio,	representation,	and	nonsenuous	similarity”	(Gebauer	and	Wulf,	1995,	1).		2	Mimicry,	in	the	strict	sense,	only	implies	“a	physical	and	no	mental	relation”	(Gebauer	and	Wulf,	1995,	p.	5).	However,	as	Aristotle	uses	mimesis,	he	moves	quite	
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that	images,	in	some	sense,	can	be	higher	forms	of	reality	than	reality	itself	(IJsseling,	1993,	350).3	This	condensed,	introductory	account	of	mimesis	has	application	and	significance	beyond	the	history	of	philosophy,	and	this	paper	specifically	focuses	on	clarifying	the	usually	hidden	process	of	mimesis	in	modern	medicine.	It	analyzes	the	central	concepts	around	which	medicine’s	epistemology	and	practice	turn	–	clinical	
pictures	–	and	seeks	to	bring	out	the	specific	mimetic,	pictorial	character	of	these	clinical	pictures	as	well	as	the	stakes	related	to	medicine’s	conceptual	representations.		If	we	consider	the	clinical	pictures	of	diseases	such	as	diabetes	and	cancer,	including	the	symptoms	and	scientific	measurements	that	typically	accompany	them,	and	how	they	affect	patients,	we	often	think	of	these	clinical	pictures	as	exact	representations	of	a	reality,	of	a	disease	that	is	out	–	or	perhaps	better	said,	in	–	there:	the	reality	of	“diabetes”	or	“cancer”	as	embodied,	represented,	living	in	the	body.	The	role	of	medicine	is	to	present	the	patient	with	a	mirror,	and	to	translate	a	patient’s	symptoms	into	a	diagnosis	grounded	in	this	reality.	There	is	a	harmony	between	conceptual	picturing	and	reality.	Accordingly,	in	the	diagnostic	process,	medicine	traces	a	patient’s	complaint	about	thirst	and	fatigue	to	its	actual	reality,	
diabetes,	and	diagnoses	the	patient	accordingly	as	diabetic.	It	is	the	doctor’s	task	to	hold	up	this	mirror	and	provide	diagnosis	and	treatment.		 Often,	perhaps	even	very	often,	this	mirroring	process	successfully	proceeds	according	to	what	medicine	claims	to	do.	The	doctor	functions	effectively	as	a	modern	scientific	detective,	Sherlock	Holmes	style,4	figuring	out	what’s	wrong	by	tracing	a	patient’s	complaints	to	the	appropriate	clinical	picture,	and	offering	diagnosis	and	treatment.	But	what	happens	in	the	case	of	so-called	“limit	cases”	–	where	patients	confront	chronic,	debilitating,	and	terminal	illnesses	and	where	the	usual	descriptive	medical	stories,	even	if	accurate	in	entailing	empirical	truths,	fall	flat	in	their	ability	to	offer	a	futural	orientation?	In	these	cases	the	mirroring	process																																																																																																																																																																						fluently	between	mimicry	(what	may	be	called	a	first	order,	physical	representation)	and	conceptual	or	artistic	representations	(which	may	be	called	second	order	representations).	In	my	own	references	to	mimesis,	I	similarly	move	fluidly	between	first	order	and	second	order	representations.		3	IJsseling	concludes	that	a	human	being,	as	a	mimetical	creature,	has	the	possibility	“to	depict	and	represent	reality	and	thereby	in	a	sense	to	duplicate	it”	(IJsseling,	1990,	26).		4	Kathryn	Montgomery	Hunter’s	Doctors	Stories	compares	the	practice	of	medicine	to	the	practice	of	detective	work:	“Like	Sherlock	Holmes	with	his	fund	of	information	about	the	odd	or	important	crimes	that	he	has	solved	himself	or	studied	carefully,	physicians	acquire	a	collection	of	cases	that	they	have	either	treated	themselves	or	observed	directly,	and	they	augment	these	with	others	reported	in	journals.	Continually	refined	and	reorganized	as	its	possessor	reads	reports	of	clinical	research	and	engages	in	the	exercise	of	clinical	judgment,	this	practical	knowledge	informs	the	interpretation	of	each	new	case	as	the	clinical	goes	about	fitting	it	to	the	clinical	taxonomy	of	diagnosis	and	therapy”	(Hunter,	1991,	44-45).		
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that	is	based	on	medicine	as	the	sole	Cartesian	“master	and	possessor”5	of	the	nature,	of	the	truth,	of	disease	finds	itself	confronted	with	a	loss	of	meaning	and	authority.	Should	medicine	in	those	limit	cases	be	the	only	authority	of	images	of	disease?	What	other	kinds	of	images	of	disease	may	be	produced,	and	how?	In	those	situations	where	no	medical	treatment	or	intervention	can	be	offered,	what	may	be	other,	complementary,	sources	of	epistemic	access	to	address	illness	and	suffering	and	the	question	of	“what	now?”			 Building	upon	the	thought	provoking,	yet	infrequently	cited	book	
Ziektebeelden6	(Clinical	Pictures,	1993)	by	Dutch	philosopher	Jan	M.	Broekman,	this	paper	seeks	to	clarify	the	meaning	of	the	pictorial	nature	of	medicine’s	clinical	pictures.	It	does	so	by	rethinking	mimesis	along	the	lines	of	Plato’s	account	in	the	
Republic	and	the	Phaedrus,	which	yields	two	different	visions	of	clinical	pictures.	In	one	vision,	based	upon	Plato’s	Republic,	mimesis	is	to	be	grasped	positively	as	a	mirroring	process	of	methexis,	with	reference	to	an	original,	ultimate	reality;	accordingly,	in	this	vision,	medicine’s	pictures	are	to	be	grasped	as	the	transparent	images	of	an	“original”	disease,	with	medicine’s	authorship	of	and	role	in	producing	such	images	hardly	questioned.	In	the	second	vision,	based	upon	a	deconstructive	reading	of	Plato’s	Phaedrus,	images	acquire	their	meaning	and	power	within	a	network	of	images,	and	infinitely	shift	in	meaning	dependent	upon	their	function	and	milieu.	For	medicine,	this	yields	a	perspective	on	medical	pictures	that	highlights	their	constructive	nature	and	thus	views	them	as	eternally	unstable	in	reference,	with	shifting	meaning	dependent	upon	a	whole	network	of	terms;	within	this	second	vision,	there	is	room	to	contextualize	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	and	to	gain	perspective	on	additional	epistemic	tools	to	create	images	of	disease	and	suffering.		I	will	contend,	following	Plato	and	Broekman,	that	seeing	images	as	images	(i.e.	highlighting	the	artificiality	of	the	image)	is	crucial	to	theorizing	medicine	and	that	considering	clinical	pictures	through	the	complex	lens	of	methexis	and	mimesis	is	crucial.	In	this	paper,	I	ascribe	value	to	both	views	on	clinical	pictures:	viewing	them	in	terms	of	methexis	(i.e.	viewing	clinical	pictures	as	mirrors	of	disease),	and	in	terms	of	a	more	playful,	contextual	sense	of	mimesis	(i.e.	viewing	clinical	pictures	as	images	of	images	within	a	network	of	meaning).	However,	since	the	view	that	sees	clinical	pictures	as	mirrors	of	disease	domineers	the	medical	discourse,	this	paper	emphasizes	the	benefits	of	the	“network”	view	of	clinical	pictures	to	contextualize	and	criticize	the	domineering	view.		Highlighting	the	pictorial	character	of	images	is	not	only	a	much-needed	
epistemic	complement	to	grasping	the	meaning	of	clinical	pictures	–	providing	room	to	review	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	and	their	possible	fallibility	–	but	offers	ethical	benefits	to	individual	patients,	especially	in	those	limit	cases	where	patients	suffer	from	chronic,	debilitating,	and	terminal	illnesses	and	where	medicine	provides	no,	or	limited,	answers	in	terms	of	treatment,	intervention,	and	meaning.	By	creating																																																									5	Cf.	Descartes,	Discours	de	la	méthode,	AT	VI,	62:	“maîtres	et	possesseurs	de	la	nature.”	6	All	translations	of	passages	cited	from	this	book	will	be	my	own.			
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room	for	a	theory	of	clinical	pictures	that	rightfully	emphasizes	its	pictorial	nature,	patients	and	doctors	alike	may	be	encouraged	to	consider	under	what	authorship,	and	with	which	epistemic	tools,	alternative,	supplemental	images	may	be	produced	to	get	at	the	existential	reality	of	disease	and	suffering.		Ultimately,	I	will	argue	that	the	epistemic	tools	provided	by	aesthetics	may	offer	such	glimpses	into	the	reality	of	disease	and	suffering,	and	may	interject	into	the	network	space	of	disease	and	illness	aesthetic	images	to	accommodate	the	visceral	experience	of	being	ill.	I	conclude	by	discussing	a	few	artistic	renditions	of	breast	cancer	to	illustrate	my	point.		
1.	Image	and	Methexis:	Clinical	Pictures	as	Mirrors	of	
Disease	In	medicine,	the	image	of	a	disease	is	presupposed	to	be	a	representation	of	reality	–	an	independent	operating	essence	that	“is	there.”	The	ontological	conception	of	disease	originates	with	Thomas	Sydenham	(1624-1689),	who	used	botanical	taxonomy	as	a	model	to	classify	the	various	types	of	diseases	(species	morbosa)	(Wieland,	1975,	107).	Consequently,	diseases	are	viewed	as	living	a	so-called	“double-life”:	they	live	both	“outside”	in	a	rational	order	and	“inside”	in	the	ill	person	(Broekman,	1993,	25).	This	conception	of	disease	is	at	the	heart	of	medical	nosology.7		 The	theory	and	practice	of	infectious	diseases	often	serves	as	a	paradigm	within	this	framework.	Since	the	cause	of	an	infectious	disease	seems	so	obviously	an	independent	“reality,”	the	disease	itself	allows	for	clear	analysis,	diagnosis	and	treatment.	This	fits	perfectly	with	medicine’s	ideal:	to	think	more	geometrico,	i.e.	to	think	logically	(geometrically)	through	the	smallest	possible	parts	of	something	in	order	to	penetrate	and	link	all	existing	causal	connections.	Thus,	the	future,	as	medicine	envisions	it,	is	a	Cartesian	mastery	of	the	world	in	which	all	uncertainty	is	banished.	This	is	how	one	doctor	formulates	it:			 The	individual	patient	is	always	a	surprise,	and	we	do	not	really	know	how	to	tackle	that	problem.	However,	the	reason	for	that	is	simply	that	we	know	much	too	little	about	the	processes	of	the	human	body.	If	we	were	really	able	to	give	a	complete	and	exhaustive	description	of	a	patient,	quantitatively	and	qualitatively,	physically	and	chemically,	there	would	be	no	more	surprises...	It	would	be	possible	to	give	a	precise	prognosis	for	the	individual	patient	and	to	work	out	a	treatment	plan	which	was	correct	from	both	theoretical	and	
																																																								7	We	could	argue	that,	conceptually,	the	rationality	of	the	disease	is	the	“higher”	reality,	at	least	if	we	follow	Plato’s	ideas	in	the	Republic.	However,	if	we	think	of	disease	as	it	is	lived	in	“being	ill,”	perhaps	the	“reality”	of	the	disease	is	constituted	by	the	unification	of	both	the	external	and	the	internal	order.		
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practical	points	of	view,	and	the	effect	of	the	treatment	would	never	surprise.	We	are	very	far	from	this	goal,	but	we	shall	get	there,	bit	by	bit.8		The	role	of	medicine	is	to	conquer	and	own	the	reality	of	disease.	If	medicine	fails,	or	if	there	are	surprises,	it	is	not	due	to	the	essence	of	medicine;	it	is	mostly	because	medicine	does	not	yet	know	enough	and	has	not	yet	fully	actualized	itself.	Only	when	it	would	have	sufficient	time,	the	right	tools,	and	correct	knowledge,	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	can	map	out	the	world	of	disease	cleanly,	transparently,	and	confidently.	The	aim	would	be	to	offer	“correct”	treatment	and	intervention,9	which	ideally	aims	to	eradicate	disease	altogether.			 The	philosophical	building	blocks	for	grasping	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	as	
mirrors	of	disease	can	be	located	in	the	view	that	sees	mimesis	unambiguously	as	
one-sided	representation	or	imitation.	Plato’s	views	on	mimesis	in	the	Republic	are	particularly	productive	to	discuss	in	this	regard,	because	he	accounts	for	both	its	negative	aspects	(“mere”	appearance	or	imaging),	or	positive	aspects	(“true	appearance	or	instantiation	by	way	of	methexis).			 The	most	famous	and	contentious	account	of	mimesis	in	the	Republic	is	undoubtedly	the	one	discussed	in	Book	X,	where	Plato	restricts	mimesis	to	the	realm	of	aesthetics.	Plato	analyzes	the	three	“creators”	of	couches	–	God,	the	carpenter,	and	the	painter	(Republic	X,	597b)	–	with	God	appearing	as	the	original	creator	of	the	couch,	the	carpenter	as	the	manufacturer	of	the	couch,	and	the	artist	as	the	one	merely	imitating	(Republic	X,	597c-e).	The	simply	imitated	image	is	that	of	sheer	semblance	and	illusion	–	it	is	“third	removed	from	the	truth”	(Republic	X,	597e).	The	imitation	of	the	idea	in	the	phenomena	is	reiterated	in	art	and	thereby	becomes	an	imitation	of	an	imitation	–	an	illusion.	Accordingly,	art,	poetry	and	music	produce	a	world	of	semblance,	based	on	the	world	of	the	phenomena	and	not	on	the	world	of	ideas,	while	at	the	same	time	bringing	about	the	illusion	to	refer	to	that	world.			 If	we	apply	Plato’s	view	on	mimesis	to	clinical	pictures	in	medicine,	much	can	be	learned.	As	a	study	of	the	phenomena,	medicine	would	likely	identify	itself	closely	with	the	carpenter.	While	it	cannot	“fashion”	disease	in	the	way	that	the	carpenter	fashions	a	couch,	medicine	purports	to	look	directly	at	the	“idea”	of	disease,	and	discerns	it	–	“carves	it	out”	–	in	the	symptoms	manifested	by	the	patient	that	it	examines.	In	addition,	in	similar	practical	fashion	to	the	carpenter	who	alleviates	“normal”	issues	of	sitting	and	lying	in	the	“real	world,”	the	doctor	seeks	to	map	a	clinical	image	that	matches	the	ailments	of	the	patient	and	seeks	to	relieve	them.10			 Moreover,	as	the	analysis	in	Book	X	of	the	Republic	clarifies,	in	this	view	of	mimesis	reference	is	all	that	matters.	Similarly,	for	medicine,	its	diagnoses	and																																																									8	These	are	the	words	of	endocrinologist	Dr.	Johnson	(Wulff,	Pedersen,	Rosenberg,	1986,	39).		9	Broekman	articulates	that,	with	modern	medicine,	the	real	“center”	of	medicine	has	become	intervention	(Broekman,	1993,	18).	10	Broekman	writes:	“The	patient	is,	as	patient,	the	carrier	of	the	image,	and	that	image	needs	to	be	recognized	as	accurately	as	possible”	(Broekman,	1993,	21).		
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images	refer	to	a	higher	reality.	As	such,	medicine	itself	presupposes	that	it	does	not	add	anything	to	the	idea	or	to	reality,	despite	its	use	of	innumerable	texts,	diagrams,	measurements,	scans,	etc.	Since	mimesis	as	imitation	only	brings	about	referents,	its	signs	or	images	should	abolish	themselves	in	their	function	as	referents.	Accordingly,	medicine	would	argue	that,	preferably,	its	images	are	only	images	–	what	ultimately	matters	is	what	its	descriptions	and	images	refer	to:	the	“reality”	of	the	disease.	In	this	respect,	the	image	itself	would	remain	“external”	to	what	it	refers	to:	the	disease.11		 Perhaps,	ideally,	medicine	would	want	to	see	its	clinical	pictures	just	as	Plato	envisions	mimesis	in	its	most	positive	role:	as	methexis,	as	participation	in	the	ideas.	This	would	move	the	story	of	imaging	beyond	that	of	Book	X,	to	be	placed	at	the	heart	of	Plato’s	ontology	in	Republic	Books	V-VII,	where	ultimately	the	things	in	our	world	–	the	phenomena	–	are	what	they	are	by	participating	in	what	is	(Republic	V,	476d).12	We	could	even	go	so	far	as	to	distinguish	mimesis	from	methexis,	by	arguing	that	mimesis	generally	emphasizes	the	difference	between	model	and	copy,	whereas	methexis	implies	“that	something	is	together	with	something	else”	(Gadamer,	2007,	310).	If	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	are	based	on	methexis	rather	than	on	mimesis,	then	this	would	be	an	important	reason	to	validate	its	clinical	pictures:	they	would	not	just	simply	be	imitations	of	the	disease,	but	the	rational	and	organized	instantiations	of	disease.	Clinical	pictures	would	thus	be	the	true,	rational	expression	and	em-placement	(Darstellung)	of	disease.13	In	parallel	fashion,	the	expression	of	the	disease	in	the	patient	would	then	be	the	messy,	embodied	correlative.		 Identical	to	how	the	icon	recalls	and	instantiates	the	divine,	medicine	believes	its	clinical	pictures	offer	the	rational	story	of	the	instantiation	of	the	disease.	By	situating	medicine	as	closely	aligned	with	methexis,	medicine	finds	itself	elevated	to	higher	levels	of	knowledge	than	are	outlined	on	the	divided	line	in	Book	VI	of	Plato’s	Republic.	The	divided	line	assigns	medicine	a	rather	limited	and	low-level	stage	of	knowledge,	pistis	(opinion)	only	minimally	divorced	from	eikasia	(image-making	or	imagination)	and	restricted	to	the	realm	of	the	“visible”	(Republic	VI,	509e-510a5).	However,	by	aligning	its	clinical	pictures	more	solidly	and	directly	with	methexis,	medicine	may	view	itself	in	a	far	more	esteemed	and	powerful	role	–	perhaps	similar	to	where	modern	medicine	might	want	to	see	itself	today,	rooted	in	mathematical	realities	such	as	statistics:	dianoia	(reasoning).14																																																										11	Broekman	emphasizes	that	the	pictorial	character	of	medicine	is	thus	kept	a	secret	(Broekman,	1993,	24,	35).		12	In	this	passage,	Plato	addresses	how	things	that	are	beautiful	participate	in	what	is	beautiful	in	itself.		13	Darstellung	means	to	present,	and	specifically	to	present	something	to	someone:	it	is	the	act	of	“placing	(Stellung)	there	(Da)”	(Davey,	1999,	19).		14	Here,	though,	we	would	not	yet	be	at	the	top	of	the	apex	of	the	divided	line	–	which	would	mean	reaching	noēsis	(understanding,	knowing).	Dianoia	is	discussed	in	Republic	VI,	510d-511a.	Dianoia	considers	intelligible	things,	but	is	separated	from	noēsis	since	it	still	uses	hypotheses	instead	of	reaching	and	thinking	through	
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	 Within	this	view	that	considers	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	mostly	in	terms	of	
methexis,	medicine	may	also	make	use	–	if	only	implicitly	–	of	Plato’s	critique	of	images	as	mere	images.	Much	of	modern	medicine,	while	committed	to	the	ontological	conception	of	disease,	has	made	progress	exactly	by	scrutinizing	its	historical	clinical	pictures,	shedding	in	the	process	those	that	are	historical	aberrations:	clinical	pictures	that	have	proven	to	be	dysfunctional	and	are	not	based	on	true	science	or	practice.	For	instance,	in	the	1980’s	the	theory	about	the	origin	of	stomach	and	duodenum	ulcers	went	through	a	paradigm	shift.	Up	until	that	time,	such	ulcers	were	thought	to	be	caused	by	stress	or	dysregulation;	both	fallacies	were	eventually	dispelled	by	Barry	J.	Marshall.	Building	upon	previous	work	done,	as	well	as	collaborating	with	other	scientists,	Marshall	proved	that	it	is	a	bacterium,	Helicobacter	Pylorii,	that	is	the	real	culprit,	and	accordingly	treatments	for	this	disease	transformed	radically.15		We	should	underline	that	much	of	modern	medicine’s	current	success	lies	in	successfully	disproving	such	false	images	that	prevailed	and	that	were	based	on	what	Plato	would	have	called	mere	image-making	(eikasia),	to	be	dismantled	as	the	very	lowest	level	of	grasping	reality.	By	eliminating	bias,	through	double-blind,	randomized,	statistically	sound	studies,	medicine	has	made	itself	more	scientific	and	more	rational.	It	is	therefore	with	good	reason	that	medicine	has	cast	former	clinical	pictures	to	the	side	and	has	sequestered	them	as	mere	images,	as	faulty	happenings	of	the	past.	Current	medicine	thereby	portrays	itself	as	different:	it	seeks	to	rely	only	on	transparent,	mirroring	images,	ones	that	“translate”	disease	into	understandable	and	treatable	terms.	Still,	many	biomedical	scientists	and	doctors	are	committed	to	sharpening	and	reviewing	clinical	pictures,	and	remain	dedicated	to	scrutinizing	clinical	pictures	with	a	certain	opacity,	such	as	many	auto-immune	diseases.		Thus,	modern	medicine	finds	itself	committed	to	the	ontological	conception	of	disease,	but	to	gain	traction	on	the	complex	reality	of	disease	as	it	is	lived,	it	has	needed	to	move	beyond	naïve	expectations	and	has	incorporated	scientific	fallibilism	in	its	epistemic	apparatus.	If	we	analyze	it	in	terms	of	Plato’s	“divided	line,”	medicine	sees	itself	as	forever	climbing	along	the	rungs	of	the	epistemic	ladder	toward	truth,	and	its	increased	scientific,	rational	standing	has	been	made	possible	by	adding	complex,	heuristic	tools.	As	a	result,	modern	medicine	offers	progressively	more	reliable	and	correct	epistemic	descriptions	of	the	empirical	reality	of	disease.		But	what	happens	when	medicine	offers	increasingly	more	reliable	and	correct	epistemic	descriptions	of	the	empirical	reality	of	disease,	but	its	descriptions	nonetheless	no	longer	offer	outlooks	into	treatments	or	interventions,	such	as	in	the	case	of	chronic,	debilitating,	or	terminal	illnesses?	What	if	medicine	has	increasingly	more	carefully	constructed	its	theoretical	image	of	disease,	but	this	image	falls	flat	in	light	of	the	concrete	reality	of	disease	and	suffering	that	finds	no	further	alleviation?	Is	it	perhaps	the	case	that	in	limit	cases	medicine’s	clinical	pictures																																																																																																																																																																						the	things	themselves.	I	am	grateful	to	my	colleague	Michael	Torre	for	discussing	the	divided	line	in	more	detail	with	me.		15	Cf.	Marshall,	1995,	274(13):	1064-1066.		
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ultimately	participate	more	in	the	reality	of	an	‘ideal’	disease,	rather	than	in	that	of	the	lived,	existential	reality	of	the	patient?	And	would	an	account	that	addresses	the	fact	that	there	is	always	necessarily	a	gap	between	concept	and	reality	be	helpful	here?	The	next	section	of	this	paper	will	try	to	address	these	questions	and	will	turn	to	a	multidimensional	view	of	images	and	pictures,	yielding	important	consequences	for	understanding	the	reality	of	living	with	an	illness.			
2.	Image	and	Mimesis:	Clinical	Pictures	as	Pictures	of	
Pictures	within	a	Network	In	those	“limit	cases”	where	medicine’s	clinical	pictures,	despite	gaining	epistemic	traction,	seem	to	fall	flat,	we	suddenly	experience	the	images	as	images:	while	previously	seemingly	non-present	–	as	transparent	media,	effectively	and	successfully	getting	access	to	the	truth	of	disease	–	in	those	limit	cases	where	their	usability	wears	off,	they	lose	their	transparency	and	gain	opaqueness.	Thus	they	transform	from	usable,	transparent	media	to	detached,	opaque	and	ambiguous	pictorial	“things”	or	“objects.”		This	emergence	of	the	image	character	of	clinical	pictures	may	best	be	grasped	by	comparing	it	to	the	way	that	Heidegger,	in	Being	and	Time,	describes	the	emergent	conspicuousness	of	a	damaged	or	missing	tool.	Heidegger	describes	how	a	piece	of	equipment,	once	it	is	damaged	or	missing,	comes	to	the	fore	in	all	its	conspicuousness,	obtrusiveness,	and	even	obstinacy	when	it	no	longer	functions	self-evidently	in	our	practical	handling	of	it	(Heidegger,	1962,	BT	§	16,	103-4).	While	before,	we	simply	“forgot”	it	as	part	of	our	practical	concern,	when	it	breaks	down	or	goes	missing,	this	piece	of	equipment	suddenly	emerges	in	its	almost	thing-like	character.16	To	translate	this	thought	to	the	context	of	clinical	pictures:	in	limit	cases,	when	clinical	pictures	are	no	longer	able	to	function	as	simply	usable	devices	in	terms	of	treatment	or	existential	meaning-giving,	the	pictorial	nature	of	clinical	pictures	can	no	longer	be	“forgotten”	and	comes	to	the	fore	as	a	conspicuous,	obtrusive	and	possibly	even	obstinate	reality	to	be	reckoned	with.	Only	in	those	circumstances	where	the	hammer	does	not	work	or	is	missing,	and	similarly	in	those	cases	where	the	clinical	picture	cannot	meaningfully	address	the	full	reality	of	a	patient’s	suffering,	do	we	become	aware	of	the	usually	hidden	and	forgotten	production	of	images	and	meanings.	Once	we	zoom	in	on	this	process	of	the	generation	of	images	in	medicine,	we	notice	that	the	clinical	picture	as	image	is	always	more	than	a	sheer	copy	or	a	rational	instantiation	of	a	disease.	In	that	sense,	the	clinical	picture	is	always	less	determined,	stable	and	reliable	than	seems	to	be	
																																																								16	To	speak	in	Heideggerian	terms:	instead	of	simply	being	“ready-to-hand,”	it	emerges	most	prominently	now	as	“present-at-hand.”	However,	as	Heidegger	also	keenly	notes,	that	which	is	present-at-hand	is	still	connected,	and	not	severed	off,	from	what	is	being	ready-to-hand,	since	the	ready-to-hand	still	shows	itself,	and	precisely	in	its	unusability	(Heidegger,	1962,	BT	§	16,	104).		
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the	case.	17	More	than	a	sheer	copy,	the	clinical	picture	as	picture	expresses	a	mimetical	happening	in	reality:	through	the	picture	epistemic	access	is	gained	to	the	world,	to	the	“scene”	of	medicine	(Broekman,	1993,	122).	Stronger	formulated:	the	clinical	picture	is	depiction	and	expression	(Darstellung)	of	a	reality:	however,	it	is	depiction	not	only	of	a	physical	reality	(disease),	but	includes	the	medical	reality	(the	medical	discourse)	as	well.	And	to	inflect	this	idea	with	the	import	of	Heidegger’s	example	of	a	piece	of	equipment:	similar	to	a	piece	of	equipment	(such	as	a	hammer)	that	could	only	function	as	such	within	a	whole	world	of	circumspective	concern,	we	could	argue	that	the	clinical	picture	can	only	serve	its	function	within	the	whole	medical	context	of	concern	(Heidegger,	1962,	BT	§	15,	97-98).			 This	complements	the	previous	discussion	of	clinical	pictures	in	important	ways.	Instead	of	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	being	only	the	depiction	and	instantiation	of	disease,	this	implies	that	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	may	additionally	refer	to	medical	nosology	itself.	Instead	of	being	sole	referents	to	an	external	reality,	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	thus	also	become	internal	referents	to	the	meaning,	functioning	and	context	of	the	medical	practice	itself	(Broekman,	1993,	110).			 To	grasp	this	additional,	alternative	story	of	the	meaning	and	reference	of	clinical	pictures,	Plato’s	complex	and	engaging	ideas	on	mimesis	can,	once	again,	offer	a	guide.	This	time	Plato’s	Phaedrus	might	suit	us	well	to	offer	illustration	of	the	ambiguous	nature	of	referents	such	as	images	and	texts.18	In	Plato’s	retelling	of	the	Egyptian	myth	about	the	origin	of	writing,	Theuth,	the	god	of	writing,	instructs	King	Thamus	to	disseminate	writing	among	the	people.	The	gift	that	is	given	is	as	ambivalent	as	a	pharmakon:	while	according	to	the	God	it	is	a	medicine	(pharmakon)	to	aid	memory	and	wisdom,	King	Thamus	perceives	it	as	a	poison	(274e6;	pharmakon)	that	introduces	forgetfulness,	a	vague	calling-to-mind	(hypomnēsis)	that	fosters	the	appearance	of	wisdom,	but	not	its	reality.	Texts,	like	images,	may	thus	be	solely	functioning	as	dead	reiterations,	semblances,	without	active	connection	to	knowledge	and	reality.			 In	this	negative	view	of	written	words,	they	remain	silent,	like	painted	images,	and	cannot	defend	themselves.	These	referents	need	their	author,	their	“father,”	for	support	(275e4)	and	without	that	they	remain	at	risk	of	being	misinterpreted.	Because	of	the	risk	of	misinterpretation,	writers	(and	thinkers)	have	to	be	very	careful	in	choosing	their	audience.	Just	like	a	farmer	anticipating	the	most	proper	time	to	seed	plants	(276b-c),	those	who	write	need	to	be	similarly	“sensible	
																																																								17	Clinical	pictures	in	psychiatry	and	psychopathology	show	their	indeterminacy	and	instability,	however,	more	clearly	than	other	kinds	of	clinical	pictures,	as	Broekman	also	notes	(Broekman,	1993,	108).		18	Similar	to	the	general	idea	of	images	articulated	in	this	section,	namely	seeing	them	as	being	part	of	a	network	of	images,	I	am	speaking	here	of	words	and	text	in	a	similar,	post-structural	sense,	namely	seeing	them	as	part	of	a	network	of	symbols,	not	just	as	one-directional,	unambiguous		references.		
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with	seeds”	(276c)	and	carefully	consider	and	choose	those	souls	that	are	ready	to	receive	them	(276e-277a).19			 What	Plato’s	story	illustrates	so	clearly	and	beautifully	is	the	power	and	undecided	meaning	of	referents	such	as	texts	and	images.	Plato	warns	against	words	and	images	precisely	because	of	his	understanding	that	their	power	is	so	great	and	that	their	meaning	is	so	ambivalent:	ideally	the	author	should	come	to	the	rescue	and	select	the	audience	within	which	these	referents	can	take	root.	Of	course,	Plato	knows	that	this	“rescue”	is	impossible,	and	that	his	own	images	–	infinite	in	depth	and	breadth,	including	not	only	the	images	and	stories	such	as	the	Myth	of	Er	or	the	
Allegory	of	the	Cave,	but	the	entire	composition	of	his	whole	oeuvre	–	will	and	should	abandon	their	author.	The	freedom	and	creativity	that	instills	images	and	texts	with	their	power,	comes	with	the	price	of	realizing	and	accepting	that	those	texts	and	images	necessarily	have	to	abandon	their	author	and	acquire	their	meaning	within	new	systems	of	referents,	with	new	interpreters	and	new	susceptibilities.	This	is	the	risk	of	any	referent	that	remains.			 While	Plato	might	point	us	to	the	ambivalence	of	referents	as	a	risk,	Derrida’s	reading	of	the	Phaedrus	in	Plato’s	Pharmacy	embraces	this	ambiguity	wholeheartedly	and	tries	to	dismantle	the	preference	Plato	gives	–	at	least	superficially	–	to	speaking	(Derrida,	1981,	139).	Following	Derrida’s	trajectory,	i.e.	embracing	the	ambivalence	of	pictures	and	texts,	would	be	very	productive	for	our	project	to	grasp	the	origin	and	meaning	of	clinical	pictures	in	the	world	of	medicine,	because	it	might	have	the	benefit	of	acquiring	insights	into	offering	alternative	kinds	of	stories	or	images.			 How	might	this	work?	Similar	to	the	meaning	and	structure	common	to	the	
pharmakon	and	writing,	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	both	include	the	meaning	of	remedy	and	poison	as	well	as	all	gradations	between.	For	instance,	medicine’s	clinical	picture	of	a	broken	hip	and	its	associated	treatment	can	offer	the	remedy	that	its	clinical	picture	ideally	purports	to	provide.	However,	I	want	to	argue	that	this	clinical	picture	may	also	deceive,	and	possibly	function	even	as	a	poison,	insofar	as	this	clinical	picture	might	fail	the	patient:	for	instance	there	where	hip	replacement	encounters	complications	–	an	improper	fit,	an	infection,	an	improperly	manufactured	artificial	joint,	disability,	even	death.	All	these	complications,	one	could	argue,	are	not	just	secondary,	but	precisely	reveal	and	bring	out	what	is	usually	
forgotten:	namely	that	the	clinical	picture,	even	of	a	simple	broken	joint,	does	not	only,	not	even	predominantly,	refer	to	a	disease	or	simple	fracture,	but	involves	the	
whole	context	of	referents	that	make	this	image	possible:	accidents,	old	age,	osteoporosis,	surgeons,	patients,	scalpels,	hygiene,	bacteria,	pharmaceutical	companies,	capitalism,	greed,	science,	etc.			 In	fact,	if	we	pursue	this	arc	of	thinking	further,	following	Derrida’s	fruitful	reading	of	Plato’s	pharmakon,	we	could	argue	that	concepts	and	practices	such	as																																																									19	Plato	emphasizes	the	endless	fecundity	of	such	“sowing	of	words,”	for	instance	when	he	writes	that	the	dialectician	“chooses	a	proper	soul	and	plants	and	sows	within	it	discourse	accompanied	by	knowledge	–	discourse	capable	of	helping	itself	as	well	as	the	man	who	planted	it,	which	is	not	barren	but	produces	a	seed	from	which	more	discourse	grows	in	the	character	of	others”	(276e).			
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those	operating	in	medicine’s	clinical	pictures	may	produce	empirical	truths,	but	also	acquire	meaning	in	textual,	conceptual	and	cultural	chains,	in	which	one	concept	refers	to	and	syntactically	plays	with	the	others.20	Accordingly,	in	addition	to	entailing	certain	empirical	truths,	clinical	pictures	acquire	meaning	through	their	dependence	upon	other	pictures,	concepts,	and	practices.	This	makes	the	meaning	of	clinical	pictures	relatively	unstable,	since	the	network	of	concepts	and	practices	upon	which	they	depend,	and	the	context	within	which	they	are	perceived,	is	always	subject	to	change.		 If	we	assess	historical	descriptions	of	particular	diseases,	we	find	ourselves	constantly	confronted	with	the	flexibility	and	instability	of	medicine’s	clinical	pictures,	pointing	towards	a	latent	anarchy	and	undecidability	underlying	all	pictures	(cf.	Broekman,	1993,	118).	For	instance,	the	tuberculosis	as	Thomas	Mann	describes	it	in	The	Magic	Mountain	is	an	example	of	a	disease	that	we	no	longer	know	in	our	culture,	that	is	to	say:	we	know	it,	but	in	a	totally	different	way,	associated	with	other	images.	Whereas	we	currently	view	it	as	a	disease	mostly	associated	with	drug-addicts	and	HIV,	and	treat	it	with	antibiotics,	Hans	Castorp	in	the	Magic	Mountain	experiences	it	predominantly	as	a	disease	of	reclusion,	necessitating	clean	mountain	air,	prolonged	residency	and	medical	institutionalization,	with	suffering	and	death	looming	all	too	close.			 This	historical	evolution	of	the	meaning	of	the	clinical	picture	of	tuberculosis	shows	that	clinical	pictures	do	not	adhere	to	strict,	permanent	ontologies,	but	find	themselves	in	a	Heraclitean	flux	of	meaning.	This	flux	of	meaning	is	particularly	strong	in	our	current	technological	age,	where	images	are	exponentially	replicated	and,	seemingly,	come	to	live,	and	live	on,	by	their	own	device.	As	Michael	Naas	poignantly	puts	it	in	Derrida	From	Now	On:	“Postmodernity	is	thus	the	time	of	specters,	of	images,	sounds,	and	digital	imprints	that	all	outlive,	or	at	least	potentially	outlive,	the	things	they	purport	to	represent.	In	postmodernity,	the	image	is	no	longer	three	removes	from	the	real	(...),	but	something	more	powerful	and	in	some	sense	more	real	than	the	real	itself”	(Naas,	2008,	180).		
3.	The	Need	to	Access	and	Produce	Supplemental	Images	
of	Disease	and	Suffering	I	want	to	argue	that,	instead	of	denying	its	pictorial	character,	medicine	would	do	well	in	our	current	postmodern	age	to	confirm	its	pictorial	character,	to	abandon	the	idea	that	it	is	the	sole	proprietor	and	mirror	of	the	reality	of	disease,	and	to	allow	room	for	the	creation	of	other	stories,	of	other	images,	of	other	meanings.	It	needs	to	realize	the	gap	between	concept	and	natural	world.	Much	like	Plato’s	advice	to	the	writers	of	words,	medicine	should	carefully	and	responsibly	handle	its	authorship	and	know	in	what	situations	–	and	in	which	existentially	dire	situations	–	its	images	may	no	longer	bear	fruit,	even	if	its	epistemic	truths	are	correct.	Given	the																																																									20	In	this	way,	Derrida	shows	how	Plato’s	own	use	of	the	term	‘pharmakon’	is	dependent	on	many	other	terms	(Derrida,	1981,	130).	
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context,	and	given	the	number	of	variables	in	existential	situations,	these	medical	truths,	while	accurate,	may	fail	to	provide	meaning	to	the	living	reality	of	disease	and	suffering.	For	many	instances	of	disease,	medicine	is	the	correct	“author”	of	the	image	of	disease,	but	limit	cases	show	the	boundaries	of	its	authorship	and	application.		Much	like	Plato	suggests	in	his	famous	Allegory	of	the	Cave,	discerning	pictures	as	pictures	is	not	only	epistemologically	necessary	but,	most	importantly,	ethically	warranted.	Accordingly,	when	it	fails	to	recognize	the	pictorial	character	of	its	clinical	pictures,	medicine	needs	to	realize	that	it	otherwise	threatens	to	serve	its	own	theory	more	than	the	being	ill	of	the	patient.	The	illness	that	patients	experience	is	singular,	unique,	open	and	indeterminate	–	just	as	each	individual	being	is.	This	indeterminacy	cannot	be	translated	into	generalizations,	which	prioritize	collectivity	over	individuality.	And	certainly	in	the	case	of	chronic,	debilitating,	or	terminal	illnesses,	what	may	offer	strength	is	a	return	and	confirmation	of	individuality,	and	a	release	from	the	general	view	and	statistics.	What	matters	in	those	pivotal	experiences	is	not	only	the	ascription	to	a	treatment	–	or	the	lack	thereof	–	but	to	live	in	and	with	an	illness	as	best	as	one	can.21			 If	mimesis	finds	its	strength	in	the	need	to	play	and	simulate	and	create,	then	limit	cases	show	the	necessity	to	escape	the	tight	grip	that	medicine	has	had	on	images	of	disease	and	the	need	to	supplement	its	ownership	and	diversify	it.	Perhaps	even	better,	prior	to	discovering	that	medicine	may	offer	no	solution	in	the	case	of	such	painful	circumstances,	patients	and	doctors	alike	would	do	well	to	be	prepared	for	the	strength	of	mimesis	–	in	both	a	positive	and	negative	sense.	Creating	truths	and	falsehoods	alike,	as	well	as	hope	and	despair,	mimesis	remains	elusive	and	that	is	precisely	its	strength.	Moreover,	we	need	to	arrive	at	the	realization	that	our	own	lives	are	always	already	centered	around	representation,	and	that	we	need	to	tap	into	the	inner	mimetic	resources	with	which	we	already	live.	As	Broekman	poignantly	writes:	“every	human	state	is	a	representation,	is	itself	scenic	insofar	as	it	is	involved	in	its	own	representation,	its	own	work	on	language	and	concept,	its	own	meaning	and	mis-en-scène”	(Broekman,	1993,	110).22		 However,	is	this	to	say	that	anything	goes	and	that	any	image	can	work?	This	is	an	important	point	to	consider,	especially	since	I	do	not	want	to	plea	for	relativism	or	want	to	support	those	kinds	of	images	that	simply	deny	to	medicine	some	of	its	hard-fought,	rational	truths,	which	are	hashed	out	in	propositions	such	as	“this	patient	has	breast	cancer”	or	“this	patient	is	allergic	to	penicillin”	or	“celiac																																																									21	A	case	in	point	is	the	powerful	phenomenological	analysis	of	Kay	Toombs,	describing	her	life	living	with	multiple	sclerosis.	Her	illness,	she	writes,	is	not	that	of	“abnormal	reflexes,”	but	rather	that	of	“the	impossibility	of	taking	a	walk	around	the	block,	or	climbing	the	stairs	to	reach	the	second	floor	in	my	house,	or	of	carrying	a	cup	of	coffee	from	the	kitchen	to	the	den”	(Toombs,	2001,	247).	Karin	Spaink	is	also	an	example	of	a	(Dutch)	writer	thematizing	her	life	living	with	multiple	sclerosis	as	well	as	breast	cancer.	See	for	instance	her	autobiography	Vallende	vrouw	(1993),	and	her	book	about	breast	cancer	Open	en	Bloot	(2006).		22	The	Dutch	here	has	“scènisch,”	which	Broekman	uses	to	evoke	the	dramaturgy,	the	“mis-en-scène,”	within	which	the	images	and	meanings	of	life	are	embedded.			
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disease	requires	a	gluten-free	diet.”23	Anti-rational	or	anti-scientific	images	are	not	the	kind	of	images	that	I	think	would	ultimately	help	a	patient	with	a	chronic	or	terminal	illness;	in	fact,	they	may	be	counterproductive.	Rather,	what	is	needed	is	an	alternative,	additional	epistemic	tool	that	provides	context,	and	complementarity,	to	the	field	of	medicine	in	its	creation	of	images.	What	may	bring	about	a	different	organization	of	the	network	space	around	disease	and	illness,	such	that	the	visceral	experience	of	disease	may	be	attested	to?	The	answer,	I	will	articulate,	is	art.			
4.	Concluding	Remarks	and	Artistic	Applications:	Re-
Imagining	Breast	Cancer	Art	is,	in	my	perspective,	one	of	these	epistemic	tools	that	provide	access	to	a	form	of	image	production	that	serves	as	a	complement	to	conceptual,	representative	thinking	(Adorno	and	Horkheimer,	1969,	19).	Art	and	its	mimetic	production	may	provide	an	alternative	complement	to	a	field	such	as	medicine	since	it	offers	images	that	provide	a	non-competitive,	yet	enriching	way	to	grasp	disease	and	illness.	It	interjects	into	the	network	space	around	disease	and	illness	a	different	kind	of	image,	one	that	is	non-discursive	and	speaks	to	the	unique,	visceral	aspects	of	life,	without	claiming	adequatio	between	its	image	and	reality.		Following	Adorno	and	Horkheimer,	the	kind	of	mimesis	at	stake	here	does	not	include	the	controlling	assimilation	of	reality	(Adorno	and	Horkheimer,	1969,	15),	but	is	characterized	by	the	production	of	images	within	an	uncontrollable,	free	submission	or	“adhesion”	to	reality:	Anschmiegung	(Adorno	and	Horkheimer,	1969,	26).	Unburdened	and	undetermined	by	a	priori	categories,	this	mimetical	process	may	accordingly	hear	the	voice	of	reality	more	clearly,	in	its	unique	otherness,	while	opening	up	to	the	realization	that	this	reality	may	never	be	completely	grasped	nor	represented	(Adorno,	1966,	28).	Importantly,	this	form	of	mimesis	may	thus	prevent	more	theoretically	and	scientifically	rigorous	forms	of	representation,	such	as	the	discourse	of	medicine,	from	becoming	victim	to	their	own	totalizing	moments.		Should	we	start	looking	for	actual	images	that	tap	into	this,	other,	mimetically	more	playful	and	artistic	register,	the	images	produced	are	perhaps	not	what	we	find	easy,	comfortable,	or	even	pleasurable.	The	images	may	be	raw,	uncensored,	and	crude.	In	some	cases,	there	may	be	no	further	hope	conveyed,	no	higher	ultimate	meaning,	no	sublation.	I	was	recently	drawn	to	large-scale	portraits	that	fashion	photographer	David	Jay	has	taken	of	young	breast	cancer	survivors	as	part	of	what	is	called	“The	SCAR	Project,”	with	the	subtitle	“Breast	Cancer	is	Not	a	Pink	Ribbon.”24	It	takes	courage	to	look	at	these	pictures,	and	–	I	can	only	imagine	–	even	more	courage	for	these	patients	to	agree	to	be	photographed.	These	images	are	images	from	beyond	the	pink	ribbon	of	trendy	mainstream,	capitalist-infused,	commercial	perspectives	(Hernandez	1998).	The	glamorous	style	of	these																																																									23	The	insights	here	are	due	to	a	careful	reading	of	this	paper	by	Dorothea	Olkowski,	for	which	I	am	very	grateful.	24	http://www.thescarproject.org/mission.	Accessed	June	22,	2017.		
	 15	
photographs	playfully	invokes	the	fashionable	commercialism	associated	with	the	pink	ribbon	campaign,	while	its	raw	content	instantly	dismisses	the	naïve	image	of	hope	and	recovery	that	this	campaign	promotes.	Instead,	we	see	young	bodies	with	enormous	scars	and	no	breast	tissue	remaining,	we	see	asymmetry,	we	see	breast	tissue	without	nipples,	we	see	burnt	skin,	we	see	loneliness	or	partners	gently	and	vulnerably	holding	their	loved	ones.	In	those	pictures,	we	find	no	higher,	generalized	concepts,	but	contradictory	assemblages	of	aspects	of	human	experience	–	vulnerability	and	strength,	loneliness	and	partnership,	shame	and	pride,	and	much	more	–	that	point	towards	an	uneasy	trajectory	in	which	futural	possibilities	may	be	generated.		The	SCAR	Project	is	only	one	example	of	a	place	where	mimetic	forces	prove	their	power,	providing	us	uneasy	catalysts	in	reclaiming	and	diversifying	cultural	images	of	illness	and	disease.	Another	example	that	diversifies	images	connected	with	breast	cancer,	and	does	so	from	the	perspective	of	the	artist’s	personal	sphere,	is	the	work	of	artist	Hannah	Wilke.25	In	her	Portrait	of	the	Artist	with	Her	Mother	
Selma	Butter	from	the	So	Help	Me	Hannah	Series	(1978–81),	the	artist	portrays	her	own	body	as	well	as	that	of	her	mother,	ravaged	by	disease,	in	a	diptych	format.	Through	juxtaposition,	duplicating	her	mother’s	wounds	on	her	own	body	as	anatomical	artifacts,	Wilke	shows	that	the	meaning	of	terminal	illness	is	not	limited	to	the	individual,	but	finds	its	axis	in	the	shared	sphere	of	living-and-dying	together.	If	Sloterdijk,	following	Levinas,	is	correct	in	assuming	that	death	is	mostly	experienced	in	terms	of	the	one	witnessing	death,	and	if	death	ultimately	implies	more	the	dissolution	of	a	shared	sphere	rather	than	only	the	death	of	an	individual	being	(Sloterdijk,	2011,	48),	then	the	image	that	the	artist	renders	here	of	illness	and	finitude	–	“having	literally	incorporated	her	mother,	illness	and	all”	(Jones,	1998,	189)	–	speaks	to	the	fact	that	images	of	illness	need	to	refer	to	this	network	of	co-fragility	and	speak	to	our	“shared	existential	risk”	(Sloterdijk,	2016,	48).			 These	examples	are	limited,	and	many	more	could	be	given.	Still,	they	provide	brief	glimpses	into	another,	complementary	realm	of	image-creation,	where	images	engage	those	elements	of	affectively	living	in-and-with-illness	that	are	too	often	forgotten	or	denied	in	the	cultural	sphere,	or	not	seen	within	the	discourse	of	medicine	itself:	the	scars	remaining,	the	emotional	impact	on	families,	the	shared	spheres	of	suffering.	In	their	artistic	renderings	of	such	scars	and	emotional	impacts,	the	SCAR	Project	and	Wilke’s	art	may	not	quite	evoke	the	pleasure,	or	higher	reality,	that	Aristotle	and	Hegel	associate	with	artistic	renditions	of	that	which	we	usually	find	horrific	(IJsseling,	1993,	350),	but	those	artworks	provide,	through	aesthetic	abstraction,	affirmation	of	–	and	solidarity	with	–	the	felt	experiences	that	are	otherwise	not,	or	hardly,	acknowledged.	In	this	way,	they	may	open	up	to	alternate	windows	of	creating	meaning	with	and	through	the	unique	lived	experience	of	having	breast	cancer.	While	the	clinical	picture	connects	to	the	empirical	reality	of	disease,	the	aesthetic	picture	gives	voice	to	the	multiperspectival,	existential	space	of	living-and-dying	with	illness,	which	may	include	altered	relationships	(e.g.	in																																																									25	See	http://withreferencetodeath.philippocock.net/blog/wilke-hannah-in-memorium-selma-butter-mommy-1979/	Accessed	June	22,	2017.	With	special	thanks	to	my	colleague	Paula	Birnbaum	for	pointing	me	to	Wilke’s	art.		
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terms	of	both	isolation	and	solidarity),	revised	perceptions	of	beauty,	and	changed	assessments	on	what	work	and	being	‘productive’	in	society	means.		Still	much	more	needs	to	be	done	to	promote	the	field	of	aesthetics	to	produce	additional	epistemic	tools	that	contextualize	and	complement	the	images	of	disease	that	our	culture	and	the	medical	discourse	offer.	Nevertheless,	projects	and	artworks	such	as	The	SCAR	Project	and	Wilke’s	art	provide	impetus	for	ever-spreading	alternatives,	which	take	on	the	ambiguity	and	productivity	of	images,	so	as	to	spread	and	diversify	the	meanings	of	images	of	disease,	and	to	generate	new	futural	orientations	for	those	who	really	need	it.26			
		
	 	
																																																								26	I	am	thankful	to	the	anonymous	reviewers	of	this	journal	for	their	comments	on	this	article.	I	owe	special	gratitude	to	those	who	–	many	years	ago	–	helped	me	to	develop	this	project	on	mimesis	and	clinical	pictures,	and	in	particular	Matthias	Karger.	A	special	note	of	gratitude	is	also	due	to	Daniel	O’Connell,	whose	constructive,	honest,	and	critical	feedback	improved	the	content	and	argument	of	this	paper	in	remarkable	and	substantial	ways.	I	am	also	grateful	to	my	research	assistants	Heather	Fox,	Stan	O’Neill	and	Lincoln	Stefanello	for	their	fruitful	suggestions	and	editorial	assistance	with	this	article.	My	USF	colleagues	Paula	Birnbaum	and	Michael	Torre	helped	me	with	refining	important	elements	of	my	analysis.	I	also	benefited	from	the	feedback	of	the	participants	of	the	2014	Annual	Meeting	of	the	Pacific	Association	of	the	Continental	Tradition	(PACT)	at	Loyola	Marymount	University,	and	specifically	the	comments	from	Dorothea	Olkowski,	Sam	Talcott,	and	Peter	Warnek.		
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